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Abstract 
Land tenure has been a major issue in Ghana. Land is an important 
asset that improves the livelihoods of poorer groups in every society, the 
world over. Farmer livelihood decisions as regards cropping strategies and 
input are strongly influenced by land tenure arrangements. Efforts by 
investors particularly migrants who need land to invest are hampered by the 
tenurial arrangements prevailing in our societies as is the case of Wenchi 
traditional area. Rights to land by these migrants are limited as the 
indigenous Bono are not willing to lease land for longer periods for long 
term investment purposes. They argue that migrant farmers from north-west 
of Ghana do not usually put the land to efficient use for it to maintain some 
level of nutrients. Another argument is that migrant farmers always try to 
cheat them on their own land by hiding some of the produce from their 
landlords. The migrants also argue that once they are not allowed to take 
greater percentage of farm produce from the farm, it would not be 
economical for them to manage the land the way their landlords want them 
to do. They argue further that cost of input on the farms is borne by them for 
only the landlords to get almost the same benefits as them (under the 
Abunu). Therefore, the use of land breeds tension between the two parties. A 
case study approach using Dagara migrant farmers from north western 
Ghana who migrate to Bono area in search of farm lands was used.An 
extensive literature review was also used in the methodology. The issues that 
emanated from the findings indicated that different communities and 
different people have their own ways of tenurial arrangements  that result in 
conflicts most often. The conclusions drawn from the analysis show that 
conflict is pervasive due to disagreements over share of produce. It is 
recommended that efforts should be made by both parties to ensure that 
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appropriate measures are put in place for efficient and appropriate land use 
by integrating customary and statutory policies. 
 
Keywords: Resource Conflicts, Agricultural Land Use, Land Tenure 
systems, Migrant Farmers, Land Holding 
 
Introduction 
In Ghana, as in other West African countries, contestation over land 
is particularly acute, and seems likely to intensify over time. The pressures of 
population growth, cash-crop led marketisation, large scale migration, and 
rapid urbanization have produced increased competition and land scarcity 
have resulted in increasing politicized conflicts over land (IIED, 1999, cited 
by Crook; 2005). Some of these conflicts including indigene-migrant, inter-
communal, inter-generational, and gender-based conflicts are motivations for 
land laws. 
In a developing economy such as Ghana, access to land and natural 
resources is important for improving the livelihoods of poorer groups. 
Farmers’ livelihood decisions with respect to cropping strategies and labour 
input are strongly influenced by land tenure arrangements (DFID, 2000 cited 
by Adjei-Nsiah 2006: 142). Several authors (Gavian and Ehui, 1999; Gavian 
and Fafchamps, 1996; Fraser, 2004) argue that contractual arrangements 
such as land renting and sharecropping reduce incentives to invest in soil 
fertility management due to tenure insecurity. Gavian and Fafchamps (1996) 
reported that tenure insecurity incites farmers to divert soil-enhancing 
resources to more secure fields whenever possible.  
 In an earlier study, Adjei-Nsiah, Leeuwis,  Giller,  Sakyi-Dawson, 
Cobbina,  Kuyper,  Abekoe  and Van Der Werf, (2004) also found an 
association between tenure insecurity among migrant farmers especially, and 
limited attention for regeneration of soil fertility. The use of land becomes 
problematic as it generates rift between land owners and migrant farmers. 
Adjei-Nsiah and associates (2004) argue that landowning natives often 
accuse migrants of degrading their lands, which in turn makes them reluctant 
to rent land to them beyond two years. The migrants cite tenure insecurity 
and high cost of land rent as reasons for not investing in soil fertility 
regeneration. Another reason is that the migrants mainly seek to satisfy their 
pressing economic needs rather than maintaining the land for long term 
investment or use. Thus, it appears that there is a widespread lack of trust 
between the migrants and the natives. The natives do not trust that when they 
rent land to migrants for a longer period, they will take good care of it. The 
migrants on the other hand are afraid that when they invest in soil fertility, 
they will not be allowed to reap the full benefits (ibid). Therefore, the 
problem that arises is the conflicts that exist between the natives and 
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migrants over tenurial arrangement involving the terms of reference during 
land acquisition. 
This paper examines agricultural land use, conflicts that exist 
between the landlords and the migrant farmers in terms of land tenure 
arrangements, prevailing conditions of migrant farmers from the source to 
the destination area. The paper would also discuss the findings that emanate, 
draw conclusions and suggest recommendations.  
 
Methodology and Scope of Study 
An extensive literature review using secondary data sources was 
adopted for the study. A case study approach, using Dagara migrants from 
north-western Ghana particularly the Lawra District to southern Ghana in 
search for farm lands was also adopted to facilitate the investigation. Yin 
(1993) has defined a case study as an empirical inquiry in which the number 
of variables exceeds the number of data points. The important aspect of case 
study data collection is the use of multiple sources of evidence-converging 
on the same set of issues. Thus, this approach is adopted because the 
phenomenon under study is not readily distinguishable from its context and 
yet both of these need to be covered. A series of discussions were carried out 
with Dagara migrants (both seasonal and permanent) and some Bono 
landlords in areas around Wenchi. The views of some returned migrants to 
the Upper West Region particularly from Lawra District were also solicited 
on the issue. The choice of Wenchi District as a case was informed by the 
fact that it is mostly the first point of call when travelling from north-western 
Ghana to southern Ghana. Many of the Dagara from the Upper West Region 
also use the District as stop over for their first experience, the first time they 
travel to the south to engage in migrant farm cultivation or work.  
Generally, migration study requires that both the source and 
destination areas be examined within different socio-cultural, economic, 
political and environmental contexts (Primavera, 2005; Harteveld, 2004; van 
der Geest, 2004). Therefore, some critical factors which influence migration 
were consciously sought for both in my discussions with the target 
population in the field as well as in the search for literature so as to make 
meaningful recommendations for resolving conflicts between the parties 
involved.  
 
Conceptual Framework On Land Arrangements 
Some concepts have been central in the analysis and investigations 
presented in this paper. These are land tenure systems, land rights; owners 
and migrant tenants who acquire land for agricultural purposes. These are 
concepts that need to be elaborated in order to gain a better understanding of 
the problem at stake. 
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Land 
Land is perhaps the single most important natural resource in the 
sense that it affects every aspect of the lives of the people. Apart from its use 
as a basis for providing shelter, land is the basis of livelihood support of rural 
populations in Ghana. Therefore, whether as a resource to a nation, region 
and urban or rural area land requires careful management for the 
maximization of benefits derived from its utilization (Boating 2005:32 cited 
by Bebelleh, 2007:97).  Amanor (2006) agreed with Amissah (1996:147) 
that, land, as a natural resource, is acknowledged as part of the property that 
belongs to the people in a particular community or district. As a communal 
property resource, it is considered the economic, social and political 
backbone of their survival as a people.  
In West Africa cash crops such as cocoa and coffee are grown in the 
forest belt which serves as a pull factor for people from the hinterlands to 
migrate to these areas with the hope of eking out a living. Migrants who hail 
from the north and other parts of Ghana troop to the more fertile forest 
regions to acquire land for cultivation. Among them are the Dagara of north-
west of Ghana, specifically the Lawra District. They often migrate and settle 
largely in the Brong Ahafo Region, particularly Wenchi District. As settlers 
they have had to negotiate for land from the Bono indigenes, (landlords). 
This often results in conflicts of various kinds. (Biebuyck, 1963; Noronha, 
1985 cited by Amanor, 2006), blamed customary tenure system for lack of 
interest and lack of attention given to land conservation and improvement 
issues, lack of security to investors in the agricultural sector, and the 
difficulty of obtaining credit since land could not be mortgaged during 
colonial times. 
 
Customary Land Use 
Under Ghanaian customary law, land rights have a three-tier structure 
(Bentsi-Enchill 1964; Ollenu 1962 quoted by Takane 2002). The first-tier is 
the land rights held by the entire groups. Land controlled by ethnic groups is 
clearly demarcated, and the land within each territory ultimately belongs to 
the people of the ethnic group as a whole. The paramount chief as the head 
of the ethnic group is the ultimate custodian of the land. In reality, however, 
several divisional chiefs, under the paramount chief, are entrusted with the 
management of the land within their territory and make decisions regarding 
land. The second-tier consists of the rights that individuals or lineages hold 
to actually utilize the land and make decisions about it. The third-tier is the 
“usufruct” right obtained through various agrarian contracts. 
The ways of acquiring land rights at the second-tier differ between 
“citizens” (indigenous inhabitants) and “strangers” (migrants). When 
individuals or lineages are indigenous inhabitants, they are entitled, by birth, 
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to use the land belonging to their communities free of any charge. Their 
rights to the land can be handed over to their heirs on a quasi-permanent 
basis through gifts or inheritance. Outsiders who do not belong to the 
indigenous communes have no such natural rights. These outsiders, Takane 
(2002) said may acquire land rights by any of these methods: (1) through 
acceptance as members of the communes; (2) through gifts from indigenous 
inhabitants; and (3) through purchase. These outsiders are fellow Akans who 
come from the same ethnic group. The situation is, however, different to the 
migrants outside the same ethnic group as in the case of migrant Dagara 
farmers and their landlords of Wenchi District.  
 
Land Tenure System in Ghana 
Land tenure in much of Africa is usually portrayed as either 
customary/traditional, or state/statutory. Customary land tenure is 
characterized by its largely unwritten nature, based on local practices and 
norms, and is flexible, negotiable and location specific. Its principles stem 
from rights established through first clearance of land, or conquest. In this 
context, “traditions” are continuously reinvented to back conflicting claims 
of different social groups (Ranger, 1983; Chanock, 1985 cited by Cotula et 
al, 2004). This evolving nature of land tenure system is as a result of 
modernity that is spreading across the globe. 
Land tenure represents, in any community, the system of rules and 
regulations that govern how land is acquired, held and used by various 
categories of people in that community. These rules and regulations provide 
answers to the questions: who can acquire land, how long the person can 
hold the land, what use the person can or cannot put the land to and what 
ownership rights can be exercised by the person? 
Within the framework of any specific social milieu, the land tenure 
system also helps define the degree and nature of access by the various 
segments of the community to land and other natural resources. Equity in the 
distribution of these resources, the level of security that is felt in landholding 
and the impact that the system has on the lives of the people who depend on 
land and other natural resources for their livelihoods are all reflections of the 
land tenure system. Thus, in an agrarian community, such as the Lawra 
District, access to or the lack of land have implications for the very survival 
of the members of the community especially the disadvantaged. 
Generally, the perception that is held is that the communal nature of 
the tenurial system confers a more secured right to the community rather 
than to the individual. It has also been a generally held view that the 
communal ownership system does not foster individual initiatives in 
preserving the natural resource base since land is seen as a common resource 
not held by anybody.  
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In general the land tenure system affects agricultural production in 
two ways. First, the ease with which farmers obtain land in order to produce 
certain crops will obviously affect the quantities produced. Secondly, the 
nature of the agreement reached between the farmer and the landowner on 
how much control the farmer has over the land will also affect production.  
 
Land Tenure/Holding Arrangements 
Land tenure arrangements are important for understanding soil 
fertility management (Edja, 2001; Ondiege, 1996, cited by Amanor2006). 
Briefly outlined are some of the different kinds of land tenure that exist in 
Wenchi.   
(1) The chief’s holding known as the stool land or the traditional 
land. This is the land the chief holds in trust for the stool. In Wenchi the stool 
land is divided into three main zones each being manned by two sub-chiefs 
known as Abusahene. The Abusahenes (literally means “share-cropping 
chiefs”) are the chiefs responsible for the management of the chief’s natural 
resources, especially land in the traditional area.  
(2) Family lands. This refers to the lands that belong to individual 
families. The family land is usually put under an Abusuapanyin (the head in 
the line of inheriting siblings) who administers the family land and 
distributes it among the other siblings with land rights. The family land is the 
land the first native family head was able to acquire and cultivate.  
(3) Individual lands. These are the lands that the first native 
individual was able to acquire and cultivate. Individual lands are also 
acquired as gifts from parents.  
(4) Government lands. These refer to lands under (re)-forestation by 
the forestry services division of the Forestry Commission of Ghana. These 
lands are given out to prospective farmers to grow their food crops while 
planting and maintaining trees for the commission. This form of arrangement 
whereby tenant farmers are given land to plant their food crops by the 
forestry commission while planting and tending trees for the commission is 
known as taungya.  
Access to land for farming in Wenchi involves a spectrum ranging 
from rights acquired through renting to right of use of a piece of land 
temporarily. From the early 1940s, when the influx of migrants began, the 
traditional council issued land to migrants on the basis of the abusa system 
or collected annual tributes (Amanor, 1993 cited in Amanor, 2006). This 
system, which was managed by the abusahene, is still being practiced in 
some part of Wenchi, especially in Buoku area where most of the land 
belongs to the traditional council. Currently, an annual fee of GH¢20.00 
(US$ 19.60) or an equivalent of a bag of maize (weighing 100 kg) is paid by 
tenant farmers to the traditional council (Amanor 2006). Once this amount is 
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paid, the migrants can clear as much land area as wished in the area allowed. 
Since migrants cannot own land in the community, the current land tenure 
arrangements suggest that migrants can only access land for farming 
purposes mainly through share-cropping, renting and taungya.  
 
In addition, unlike land renting where the landowner has no right to dictate 
what crop or combination of crops to be planted, in share-cropping the 
landowner could determine what crop or combination of crops to be planted. 
However, because of fear of cheating by migrant farmers over sharing of 
farm produce, most landlords now prefer to rent their land out to migrants 
rather than entering into share contracts with them. Amanor (2006) 
concludes that from the view point of migrant farmers, it is more profitable 
to rent land than engage in share-cropping because the quantity of farm 
produce that is usually given to landowners as their share of the farm 
produce when sold is usually higher than the money that could have been 
used to rent the land. Moreover, on rented plots they could harvest part of the 
farm produce for home consumption any time they wish without having 
conflict with anybody.  
 
Agricultural Land Use Conflict 
Land provides a major source of conflict in rural societies around the 
world (Cotula et al., 2004). Feuds between families, neighbours and 
adjourning communities frequently can be traced back to conflicting claims 
over inheritance, boundaries and rights. All societies have evolved 
mechanisms for resolving disputes, with varying sanctions, levels of force, 
processes involved and principles to guide decision-making (ibid). They 
argue further that, in sub-Saharan Africa, competition over land has 
increased in frequency and severity in the last decades. The reasons for this 
are multiple, and essentially linked to the increased scarcity of land caused 
by demographic pressures and to the higher land values determined by 
agricultural intensification and commercialisation. A large flow of people 
seeking land where they can settle and farm is a factor underlying land 
disputes in Africa. Relations between incomers and the indigenous 
inhabitants are often tense, with few common social and cultural values 
shared in common. When land starts to become scarce and hence valuable 
and marketable, uncertainties generate fears and suspicion between 
neighbours, and even within families. Therefore, Dagara migrant farmers 
who constitute the incomers in the southern sector particularly Wenchi 
District (the study area), is bound to have some problems with their Akan 
landlords resulting in conflict.    
The most frequent cause of conflict between migrant farmers and 
landlords in the Wenchi District and neighbouring districts is the tenure 
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arrangement of land and the crops cultivated by both parties. This is often as 
a result of landlords being so mean on migrant farmers on sharing of the 
crops and migrant farmers also trying to steal some of the produce without 
the knowledge of their landlords.  
 
The Emergence of Land Tenure in Wenchi District  
The Wenchi District in the Brong Ahafo Region of Ghana is 
characterized by the presence of different ethnic groups, majority of which 
are migrant farmers from the northern part of Ghana. The District has 
historically attracted a lot of farmers from northern Ghana in search of 
suitable place to farm because of its abundant natural resources, particularly 
land in the past. Originally, migrant farmers gained access to farmlands by 
presenting drinks and a salutation fee to the chiefs who then allocate land to 
them from which they were allowed to clear as much land as they could 
(Amanor, 1993). Later, in the early 1940s, when more people moved into 
Wenchi in search of fertile land for the cultivation of crops such as cocoa, 
the traditional council issued land to migrants on the basis of Abusaor 
collected annual tributes (Amanor, 1993). In Wenchi, an Abusahene(Chief 
responsible for managing natural resources in the traditional area) was 
created to manage the hiring of stool land to migrants. In the early 1960’s the 
central government banned the traditional council from raising revenues in 
tributes and instead introduced an annual fee (Amanor, 1993). Once the 
annual fee was paid, the migrant could clear as much land as he/she wished 
in the area allowed. Currently, this fee stands at GHC20.00 (US$19.60, 
2008) annually or an equivalent of 1 bag of 100 kg maize.  
 
Land, Migration and Conflicts   
Conflict and consensus are part of all social groups and are to be 
found in all societies. The extent to which they are exhibited may differ from 
one society to the other. In some societies, conflicts tend to be dominant, 
while in others, there is a stronger tendency towards consensus. The reasons 
for this varied situation among social groupings are manifold and sometimes 
tend to generate considerable controversy. Although conflict is inevitable 
and found in all social groupings and human institutions, one very interesting 
phenomenon is the tendency for all social groupings to work towards 
reducing, or at least regulating the incidence of conflict and striving towards 
achieving more consensus (Tonah, 2007:10). The search for fertile land by 
Dagara who are predominantly food crop farmers from the Upper West 
Region, specifically Lawra District to the Wenchi District in Bono-Ahafo 
Region and other parts of southern Ghana often results in conflicts. These 
conflicts take many different dimensions as a result of land acquisition and 
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cultivation. The tenurial arrangement in the land acquisition between the 
landlords and the migrants forms the major source of conflict.    
Tensions around land tenure have arisen in particular between the 
native Bonos and the migrant farmers comprising the Dagara, Lobis and 
Walas of the Upper West Region. The Bono who are the landowners tend to 
accuse the tenants of cheating during harvest time. In some occasions, 
tenants have been dragged to court or brought before the village committee 
by the natives with the least provocation, often resulting in fines being 
imposed on them (Adjei-Nsiah, 2006).  
Questions that one may raise are that what motivates food crop 
farmers to move from their place of origin in search of greener pastures? Is it 
as a result of congestion resulting from increase in population in the district 
or land infertility or it is the current changing trends in economic 
developments or needs due to modernity? Though they are all possible, the 
economic trends appear to be obvious. This can however be achieved 
through farming. Until recently some of the people from the district are 
moving into the services sector by trading.  
In addition, population density is a factor that contributes to the 
movement from the source to the destination area (Kees, 2004). The Upper 
West Region is the smallest Region in Ghana in terms of population size of 
573,860 people according to the 2000 census. With 31 inhabitants per square 
kilometre, the region is the second most sparsely populated in Ghana 
(national average: 79 inhabitants per square kilometre).  
Within the Upper West Region, Lawra District is by far the most 
densely populated (Kees, 2004). With 83 inhabitants per square kilometre in 
the year 2000, its population density is above the national average even 
though there are no large urban centres in its territory. When calculated over 
the usual resident population the population density in the year 2000 
amounted to 90 and 34 inhabitants per square kilometre for the district and 
the region respectively. The district is clearly an island of high population 
density in a region with low population density.  
From the data above, population pressure coupled with changes in 
modern trends in development such as health, education among others 
compels people to move. Kees (2004:86) in summarizing quoted Sahlins 
(1974) as ‘wants and needs’. “Wants may be easily satisfied either by 
producing much or desiring little” (Sahlins, 1974).  
Kees, (2004) said “Migration is a temporary, semi-permanent or 
permanent change of residence to a place outside the native village.” Lentz 
and Erlmann (1988) stated that, resources serve as the driving force by which 
people move. Akwesi (2003 supports Kasanga and Avis ,1988) that people 
move not just to enjoy life at their destinations, but to find productive 
resources capable of improving their lot back at home. The building of 
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modern corrugated iron roofed houses to replace the all-mud types, the 
investments in grinding mills, transport, sewing machines, trading, education 
and the remittances to support relatives back home are indicators of the long 
run objectives of undertaking internal migration in Ghana. Obeng (2003) 
agreed with Hill (1963) that migratory movements in Ghana were strongly 
determined by the distribution of economic opportunities long before 
colonization. Between 1919 and 1924, Governor Guggisberg embarked on a 
recruitment exercise to secure labour from northern territories to fill the 
vacant places left behind by the departure of Kru-labourers from Liberia. The 
colonial regime considered the area to be of little direct economic value and 
thus designated the area as a labour reserve for the supply of cheap labour for 
the mines and general labour in the cities and south (Anarfi et al., 2003 cited 
by Obeng, 2003). It is therefore not surprising that Dagara who were and are 
part of these groups of migrants who developed the taste of different levels 
of development continued to migrate southward with the hope of eking out a 
better living.   
 
Reasons for migration 
Akwesi (2003) agreed with Caldwell (1967) that migration in Ghana 
has been motivated mainly by economic considerations. Alan and 
Guggler(1994) agree with Caldwell that most people move for economic 
reasons. Also, migration streams between regions have been shown to 
correspond to income differentials between those regions. Over time as 
economic conditions at alternative destinations change, migration streams 
alternate accordingly. Nabila (1985) on the other hand indicated that Ghana’s 
internal migration is being influenced by three main factors, namely the 
differential vegetation zones of the forest and savannah with the 
preponderance of cash crops especially cocoa in the former, and existence of 
mineral resources in Southern Ghana. Such socio-economic development 
imbalances resulted in the Northern and Volta regions becoming source 
regions from which people moved out to other regions.  
Ewusi (1971) indicated that depressed social conditions at the place 
of origin are more compelling motivations for rural people to migrate than 
economic factors. However, once they decide to migrate they then base their 
choice of destination primarily on the economic opportunities available at 
that end. That is, the social conditions prevailing at their place of origin act 
as the push factor while the economic opportunities available in a particular 
town, in this case destination area acts as the pull factor attracting migrants 
to that locality (de Graft-Johnson, 1974 cited by Akwesi, 2003).  
In Ghana, however, the pull factors seem to outweigh the push factors 
(Caldwell, 1976) influencing the decision of a person to migrate. According 
to Addo (1971), in certain areas of northern Ghana there is overcrowding on 
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the rural land resources which created conditions whereby there is large-
scale seasonal out-migration from these regions to the south. In addition, the 
climatic conditions which provide for only one raining season with weather 
vagaries are the driving forces for Dagara in Lawra district migrating to the 
southern part of Ghana.  
In his theory of intervening opportunities, Akwesi (2003) agreed with 
Stouffer(1940) who did not think it was enough to consider only conditions 
existing in the place of origin (push factors) and those at the place of 
destination (pull factors) in the determination of the direction and volume of 
migration. There are certain personal factors that are of important 
consideration in the individual migrant’s decision to make a move. The 
individual personal characteristics that either encourage or inhibit migration 
include age, sex, occupation, tribe, education, income, assets, marital status, 
employment, number of children, ages of children, previous occupation, job 
experience, and the intended departure period in a year. Some of the migrant 
farmers could avoid being moved to southern Ghana let alone the push and 
pull factors but as a result of their own migration decisions. Akwesi (2003) 
further agreed with de Graft-Johnson (1974) who noted that migration is 
mostly for employment purposes so that those who are likely to migrate are 
males in the working age groups.  
Addo (1974) opine that the propensity to migrate increases steadily 
with family size. Here I agree with him in the sense that, as family size 
increases, there is pressure from both the push and pull factors thereby 
forcing people to take migratory decisions.   
However, migration may also reinforce or affirm social identities: 
migration and living among ‘others’ may reinforce a strong sense of identity 
among migrants, a sense of belonging to ‘home’ (De Haan and Rogaly, 
2002: 6-8). This may imply that migrants actively try to avoid adaptation of 
their identity to the local people’s identity. Cultural identity is an important 
issue among many migrant groups. The cultural traditions are defended 
against its alternatives. Migrants often want to keep their culture ‘pure’ and 
‘authentic’ and this may be done by claiming individual rights (Eriksen, 
2001:303 cited by Harteveld, 2004).  
 
Conflict and Disagreements on Land Relation in the Bono Area 
Assessing Farmer-landlord Conflicts 
Through an extensive literature review the main causes of farmer-
landlords conflicts in the Wenchi District and the Akans land as a whole 
have been examined. This section would compare the intervention strategy 
of migrant farmers to avoiding conflicts between their landlords and other 
institutions involved in allocating land. A number of case studies have been 
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identified through personal narratives indicating measures of resolving these 
tensions between landowners and migrant farmers. 
 
Case 1: Land Tenure Contract Involving a Dagara Migrant, and an 
Elderly Landlady  
A tenant, Deme Der, is a 33 year old migrant farmer from Lawra. He 
had stayed in Trumeso, a farming community in Wenchi off the Sunyani 
road for the past 7 years. He had earlier engaged in a share contract for one 
year with 62 year old native landlady Abena Sewaa Nyantekyi. Under the 
share contract the migrant grew maize on one (1) ha and cassava on 0.4 ha of 
land. The cassava was shared equally between the two parties while the 
maize was shared in a ratio of 1:2 with the landlady taking one portion while 
the tenant took the remaining two portions in 2005. At the end of the share 
contract, the tenant decided to abrogate the contract and search for another 
land where he could engage in different contract because the yield he 
obtained did not commensurate with the amount of labour and resources he 
invested in the land.  
A son of the landowner Kweku Nyantekyi who did not want the 
tenant to leave the land, asked him to propose an alternative arrangement 
which he thought would be beneficial to him the migrant, (Deme Der). The 
tenant then suggested that he would crop 1.2 ha of the land to maize and give 
4 bags (two bags each in the major and the minor growing seasons) of the 
produce to the landowner either in kind or in cash at the prevailing market 
price. Under this new arrangement, the tenant was responsible for harvesting, 
shelling and transporting the produce home. He would cultivate cassava on 
the remaining portion of the plot, about 0.4 hectare as a soil fertility 
regenerating strategy, the produce of which was to be shared equally 
between him and the landowner. The son of the landowner consequently 
informed the mother who agreed and came to the tenant’s house for the 
contract to be formalized.  
In the presence of the tenant’s wife, the owner of the house where he 
(the tenant) resided and another migrant farmer (Bayor Galyuoni), the 
agreement was formalized orally. However, none of the children of the 
landowner was present. In order to secure the contract, the tenant later asked 
the landowner to put the contract into writing. However, the landowner 
objected to this suggestion and said that the oral contract in the presence of 
the three witnesses was enough. The landowner explained that she did not 
want a written contract because of the cost implication; in the prevailing 
tenure system, landowners are responsible for the payment of the cost 
involved in documenting a contract.  
The tenant said he realized 15 bags of maize from the 1.2 ha he 
cropped at the end of the major cropping season 2005. He consequently gave 
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the landowner GH¢60.00 (US$59.12) a cash equivalent of two bags of maize 
each weighing 100 kg, which the woman accepted and for which she thanked 
him.  
In the minor season, the tenant cropped the land to maize. A month 
later, a daughter of the landowner went to the field. When she came home 
she asked her mother about whom she had given the land to and about the 
nature of the contract made. Upon hearing of the details of the contract, she 
objected to the contract in which the tenant was to provide the mother with 
two bags of maize every season and asked the mother to go and renegotiate 
with the tenant. Looking at the performance of the maize in the field, the 
daughter expected that the tenant was going to have a good harvest and 
therefore felt that giving the mother only two bags of maize was not enough. 
The landlady then went back to the tenant and demanded that she should be 
given a third of the produce (abusa) from the minor season maize crop 
instead of two bags of maize because the current arrangement was unfair. 
The tenant rejected the new demand. Consequently the landlady summoned 
the tenant before some members of the village unit committee to persuade 
him to give her a third of the maize produce instead of giving her two bags. 
When the witnesses were called in, they testified that the tenant was 
supposed to provide the landowner with four bags of maize (two bags each 
in the minor and the major seasons). The committee members therefore 
asked the tenant to provide the landlady with the remaining two bags after 
harvesting the minor season crop.  
Not satisfied with the ruling by the unit committee, the landlady 
threatened the tenant with a court action. The tenant consequently solicited 
the assistance of an elder KwabenaTakyi to accompany him to the landowner 
and discuss with the family how to resolve the issue. After discussions with 
the landowner she agreed to take the two bags of maize as agreed originally, 
but made it clear that she would prefer to go back to share-cropping the next 
season.  
At the beginning of the second year, the landowner told the tenant 
that she would like them to revert to the share contract which the tenant 
obliged. However, this time the tenant decided to crop only 0.5 hectare 
instead of the 1.2 hectares. Later, the tenant planned to divide the produce 
into two after harvest and then hide half and declare the remaining half for 
sharing, a trick which some tenant farmers have been playing on their 
landowners. The landowner was an old lady who could hardly walk. The 
distance from her home to the field was about 8 km and her children also do 
not go there frequently because of the distance.  
At the end of the major cropping season the tenant harvested 12 bags 
of maize. As agreed, he gave a cash equivalent of two bags of maize which 
was GH¢60.00 (US$59.12) to the landowner. After collecting the money, 
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other relatives of the landowner (who share boundary with the tenant) 
informed the landlady that the tenant harvested a truck load of maize and 
therefore the two bags of maize he gave to her did not measure up to the 
quantity of maize harvested. The landlady upon hearing this decided to end 
the contract at the end of the second year that was 2006.   
 
Case study 2: Land Tenure Contract Involving a Migrant 
(Dagao/Dagara) and a Landowner    
In this contract, the migrant involved was a 27 year old 
Dagao/Dagara (Bekyog) from Nandom who had stayed at Awesa a farming 
community in Wenchi off the Wa road for 2.5 years. During his first year 
stay he engaged in a share contract with a native Kwame Twumasi but was 
not satisfied with the arrangement at the end of the first cropping year 
(2005).  
Bekyog approached another landowner (Kwame Mensah) aged 51 
and asked if he could rent all of his 4 ha of land. Since he had no money to 
pay for an advance rent, as is usually the case, he negotiated with the 
landowner to allow him to crop and pay later at the end of the first cropping 
season. The landowner, however, was afraid that the tenant might not pay if 
there was a crop failure. He therefore proposed an alternative arrangement to 
the migrant which would not involve an upfront payment of rent. The 
landowner first asked the tenant the minimum amount of bags of maize he 
(the tenant) expected to get when he crops all the 4 hectares of land in one 
growing season. The tenant mentioned 26 bags of maize. The landowner 
therefore requested the tenant to give him 8 bags of maize every year to be 
paid in two installments of 5 and 3 bags in the major and minor seasons 
respectively. Under the contract, the landowner mentioned that he would 
reduce the number of bags to be paid only when there is a crop failure as a 
result of drought. To encourage the tenant to improve the fertility of the soil 
it was agreed that during the minor season the tenant would intercrop half of 
the maize field with cassava, the produce of which would be shared equally 
between the two parties. If the tenant decided to crop the land only once in a 
year he would have to pay the full rent in the form of maize. The contract 
would be renewed after one year if both parties are satisfied. The tenant 
indicated that if the contract becomes successful, he would plant other crops 
such as groundnut, cowpea and cassava to ensure sustainable use of the land 
and still pay the rent in the form of the maize which both parties agreed to.  
The contract was to be put into writing at the beginning of the 
cropping season before the tenant started cropping. Each party to the contract 
was to provide three people to witness the contract. When the landowner 
informed his eldest son of the envisaged contract he objected to it. He 
explained that giving all the four hectare land to the tenant would deny him 
European Scientific Journal   October 2013  edition vol.9, No.29  ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print)  e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
395 
(the son) access to land for farming. The landowner, however, ignored his 
son and went ahead and gave the land to the tenant without putting the 
contract in writing. On the day that the tenant was to begin clearing the land, 
the son of the landowner went to the house of the tenant and threatened him 
not to step foot on the land. The tenant, afraid of the threat decided not to go 
ahead with cropping the land. He did not, however, inform the landowner of 
the action of his son. 
 The above scenario shows the complexities involved in accessing 
land for agricultural purposes in Wenchi. It could be that it was a deliberate 
attempt by the landowner and the son to cheat the tenant. These are some of 
the challenges face by migrant farmers in these areas. 
 
Appraisal of the Two Case Studies in the Two Communities in 
Wenchi District 
The fact that one contract never materialized in practice, and that the 
other was discontinued after 2 years, might easily lead to the conclusion that 
both cases were a ‘failure’. The reasons for this failure have more to do with 
intra-family dynamics than with the contents of the contract per se. It shows 
how different parties and communities evaluate the distribution of gains and 
losses involved. In doing so, I draw mainly on the outcomes of the first case. 
From a purely economic perspective, the tenants and landowners involved in 
both cases remain positive about the design of the different contract when 
compared with other arrangements such as share-cropping and land renting. 
The tenant involved in case 1 argued that he did not have the 
financial capital to pay for an advance rent of GH¢30.00 (US$29.56) per 
hectare per year. The money that was to be used for the payment of rent 
could instead be used to hire labour to prepare the land for planting. The 
tenant obtained 15 bags in the major growing season and another 12 bags in 
the minor growing season from the 1.2 hectare land. Out of these, he gave 
four bags to the landlady and the rest (24 bags) became his. He argued that if 
he shared the produce with the landowner on the basis of 2:1, which is the 
normal practice with share-cropping, he would only obtain about 18 bags 
while the landlady would in theory get nine bags.  
The landowner herself was satisfied with the arrangement because 
she would get money twice in a year instead of once in two years when the 
land is rented for two years. In Wenchi land is normally rented out at US$ 30 
per hectare per year which means that the landlady gets about US$ 35 in one 
year when she rents out her 1.2 hectare land. However, under the different 
arrangement she would get US$ 116.7 from her share of 4 bags of maize in 
the first year (US$ 35 and US$81.7 from 2 bags of maize each in the major 
and minor season respectively). Thus, under this arrangement, she would 
receive an extra US$ 81.7(four hundred thousand cedis) in the first year 
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when compared with land renting. Although with share-cropping the 
landlady would in theory get 8 bags of maize instead of 4, the landlady 
realizes that this option also has some disadvantages. First of all, she incurs 
transportation and shelling costs. She is also aware of the risk of being 
cheated in the sharing of farm produce by the tenant since she lives about 8 
km away from the farm and cannot frequent herself there. In share-cropping, 
the tenant usually shares the produce, often in the absence of the landowner. 
The tenant takes his share first and leaves the landowner’s share in the field. 
In addition, the landlady reports that, depending on the circumstances, she 
may lose up to 50% of the produce due to pests, animals or the crops spoiling 
in the field. On these grounds, the landlady too continues to feel that the 
contract is beneficial in principle. The interviews and stories narrated by 
community members too suggest that the returns a landowner gets from 
share-cropping may be far lower than it would be in theory.  
The native Bono who are the landowners see the new contract as the 
best arrangement and share-cropping as the worst arrangement. They argued 
that since at the time of the contract, a hectare of land was being rented at 
GH¢25.00 (US$24.64), the landowner could have obtained only GH¢30.00 
(US$29.56), if she had rented the 1.2 ha to the tenant. However, with this 
new arrangement she earned as much as GH¢70.00 (US$68.95), about 
GH¢40.00 (US$39.41) more than what she would have earned if she had 
rented it out. Moreover, in case of crop failure due to drought the tenant was 
obliged to pay the four bags of maize as stipulated in the contract. Again, 
they argued that, if the land had been given out in the form of share contract, 
the landlady could not have obtained more than 2 bags of maize due to 
cheating by tenant farmers.  
The migrant Dagara who are the tenants also see the new 
arrangement as the most preferred arrangement and share-cropping as the 
least preferred arrangement. They argued that with this new arrangement, 
tenants do not have to worry about the problem of having to pay for advance 
rent before one can start cultivating the land. Thus, this arrangement makes it 
possible for tenants with no financial capital to rent land for farming 
purposes. Moreover tenants could consume any quantity of the crop on the 
field while it is yet to be shared without having conflict with the landowner. 
Under this arrangement, risk is not shared between the tenant and the 
landowner as happens in share-cropping. Thus, while profit is enjoyed by 
both landowner and tenant, risk is borne solely by the tenant and in a period 
of crop failure, the tenant is obliged to provide the landowner with his share 
of the farm produce.   
Returning to the experiment of new land-tenure arrangement 
contracts, it can be concluded that these efforts failed largely due to the fact 
that it is simply not clear and transparent with whom such contracts should 
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be made in the first place. This situation suggests that when there is 
ambiguity in tenure, it becomes difficult for people to experiment with new 
contractual arrangements. Ambiguities in tenure were complicated further by 
another source of uncertainty that is inherent in agricultural production, 
namely the variable climate and ecological conditions that influence 
production levels obtained. In one of the experiences (case 1) dissatisfaction 
on the side of the family of the landlady arose in particular when the tenant 
was observed to have a particularly good harvest. A weakness of the contract 
arrangement was that unlike sharecropping, it did not have an inbuilt 
provision to adjust payment to the revenue obtained. It would be interesting 
to explore whether more flexible contracts could help ameliorate disputes 
around rented land. Such an arrangement would be somewhere in between 
conventional share-cropping and conventional land renting, and seek to 
combine favourable aspects of share-cropping (e.g. adapting payment to 
revenue, ex-post payment, agreement about cropping systems) with those of 
land renting (e.g. clarity about payment, allowing continuous use of land, 
ease of preventing post-harvest losses, less liable to cheating) while avoiding 
associated weaknesses in the contract agreement.  
The findings in case 2 led again to a shift in efforts. It became clear 
that a better understanding was needed of how people deal with ambiguities 
in land-tenure, which institutions exist to reduce uncertainties and risks 
surrounding tenure arrangements, and how such institutions could be 
strengthened. Informal interviews were conducted with key informants such 
as community leaders and so-called ‘letter writers’ and ‘commissioners of 
oaths’ who were found to play a role in formalizing contracts. Some 
community leaders were interviewed. Subsequently, a survey was conducted 
among tenants to find out how many tenants had written contracts. This was 
done by first using focus group discussions to make a complete list of all 
migrants in the communities and their tenancy status. From the list, all tenant 
farmers who rent land were interviewed to find out whether they had written 
contracts or not in their communities. Amissah (1996) concluded conflicts 
and threats are very common these days between the Union of Stranger 
Farmers, and the Land Owning Groups. This affect farm output, reduces 
productivity, and creates an atmosphere of “cold war” between the two 
interest parties. 
 
Two Untrustworthy Tenants Who Tried Cheating their Landlords 
The Case of An Untrustworthy Tenant A 
Kwabena Gyabaah who is a fifty-two year old landowner loaned his 
1.5 ha land to a migrant Dagara tenant Ninfaah in Woronpo to cultivate 
maize on share contract basis. The tenant (Ninfaah) gave the landowner only 
one bag of maize weighing 100kg out of 17bags at the end of the cropping 
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season, when the landowner requested for his share of the produce. When the 
landowner Gyabaah sent him before the chief and elders, which is an 
arbitration body, the tenant pleaded guilty and explained that he sold the 
maize in order to get money to go home for his uncle’s funeral in the North. 
 
The Case of An Untrustworthy Tenant B  
Kweku Afriyie a thirty- six year-old landowner gave his 1 ha land to 
a migrant Dagara tenant (Bagnia) to cultivate maize for sharing. When the 
maize was ready for sharing, the tenant harvested the maize but before he 
informed the landowner to come for his share of the produce, he had divided 
the produce into two, hidden one-half of it in a nearby bush and declared 
only the remaining half for sharing. When the landowner arrived in the field 
he suspected that the tenant had not declared all the produce. He therefore 
decided to search the nearby bush and indeed found a heap of maize that had 
been hidden by the tenant. When the landowner threatened the tenant with a 
police arrest, the latter bolted and was never seen in the community 
afterwards. 
 
Summary and Conclusions 
Land is an asset of enormous importance for several billion rural 
dwellers in the developing world. It provides a major source of conflicts in 
rural societies the world over. Feuds between families, neighbours and 
adjoining communities frequently can be traced back to conflicting claims 
over inheritance, boundaries and rights (Cotula, Toulmin and Quan, 
2004:14). All societies have therefore evolved mechanisms for resolving 
disputes, with varying sanctions, levels of force, processes involved and 
principles to guide decision-making. The nature of rights and how strongly 
they are held vary greatly, depending on competition for land amongst others 
(ibid). With increasing population of migrant farmers, land is becoming 
scarce, the mode of acquisition changes to complexity.   
In the case of this analysis the native Bono now see the need to 
exploit the economic value of their land. Land is now either given to tenants 
for share-cropping or rented out in cash unlike former times when it was not 
difficult to acquire it even when you were a tenant. The mode of land 
acquisition becomes complicated for the tenant which does not give clear-cut 
point as to the right to the use of land. The lack of transparency in granting 
land and the acquisition of it therefore results in tensions between the two 
parties over who has the right to the use of land. As resources become 
scarcer and more valuable, those with weak rights to this resource will tend 
to lose out as in the case of Dagara migrant farmers.  
Share-cropping which is a predominant form of land rental in 
developing countries has been widely criticized – both by economists, for 
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being less efficient than cash rental contracts, and by campaigners for social 
justice, for being exploitative. This is because, unlike in the land rentals, the 
landowner determines the kind of crop to be cultivated which might not 
satisfy the tenant wishes. A disagreement over the share of produce becomes 
eminent as the landowner might claim that the tenant would hide some 
produce of the farm. Cotula et al. (2006) in supporting Amanor (2001) 
opined that, in Ghana, whereas share contracts were means by which land-
poor but labour-rich households could gain access to a piece of plot, those 
seeking for share-crop land must now put forward a significant fee in order 
to gain access. This would imply that poorer, more marginal groups are 
finding their position more difficult - an expected trend as demand for land 
becomes stronger and land values rise, Cotula et al. (2006) noted.   
In an attempt to secure land claims, many farmers are now seeking to 
document their land transactions through written contracts, formal 
witnessing or endorsement by customary chiefs and government officials. 
Supporting these efforts by linking them to formal land administration 
system and clarifying the rights and duties of the two parties may help 
address one of the main drawbacks to informal tenancies: the disincentive to 
invest in the land. The increased use of written documents to secure and 
formalize contracts has also been reported by others and elsewhere in Africa 
(Lavigne Delville, 2003; LavigneDelville et al., 2001; Amanor and 
Diderutuah, 2001 cited by Adjei et al., 2006:166). The emergence of this 
alternative way of dealing with land tenure agreements can be interpreted as 
a local response to changing socio-economic circumstances, including 
increased pressure on the land as well as frequent tensions between natives 
and migrants concerning land tenure. It shows that local actors engage 
actively in solving problems, in this case by developing institutional 
innovations (Lavigne Delville, 2003:167 cited by Adjei et al., 2006) in the 
form of written contracts for land renting and associated rules and 
procedures, as well as the growth in the numbers of service providers.  
 
Recommendations 
Some of the challenges on access to land due to tenure arrangements 
can be improved if by both customary and statutory bodies make concerted 
efforts to ensure that policies are favourable to both parties, that is, the tenant 
and the landlord. Several interventions can promote more equitable and 
efficient land use as a component of pro-poor economic growth but which 
stop short of major land reform. Some possible measures include: 
• Recognition and integration of customary rights into the legislative 
framework and their registration, where appropriate, on a 
community basis; 
European Scientific Journal   October 2013  edition vol.9, No.29  ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print)  e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
400 
• Introduction of low cost survey and registration procedures for the 
demarcation and confirmation of community land rights; 
• Building decentralized, local institutions land rights management, 
including a role for customary institutions, especially in the 
settlement of land related disputes; 
• There should be land rights advocacy for the poor by making the 
landless realize their rights to land use and the terms of reference 
in land acquisition would enhance development in the future. 
• Promotion of stakeholder participation in land policy development 
and; 
• Alternative dispute resolution using indigenous forms, techniques, 
and strategies can help address the problem of land tenure system 
in Ghana. 
If the suggested measures are well undertaken by stakeholders, it is 
believed the difficulty of acquiring land would be gone to enable people 
enhance their development.  
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